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Introduction: Beyond Monism, Dualism, Pluralism 
 
The Quest for a (Fully-Fledged) Theoretical Framework: Co-Implication, 
Embeddedness, and Interdependency between Public International Law and EU Law 
 
Violeta Moreno-Lax* and Paul Gragl** 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
This Special Issue is the result of a year-long collective reflection on the relationship between 
the EU legal order and international law. Discussions took place within the 2014-15 Annual 
Seminar Series ‘Beyond Pluralism? Co-Implication, Embeddedness and Interdependency 
between Public International Law and EU Law’ of the Centre for Law and Society in a 
Global Context of Queen Mary, University of London, convened by the co-editors of this 
volume.1  
 
The Series analysed specific legal areas from the viewpoint of both the EU and public 
international law in a range of ‘thematic dialogues’ (on monetary policy; energy and 
environmental law; human rights; crime, justice and terrorism; and common foreign and 
security policy). An inductive methodology was applied, based on direct observation of the 
respective thematic field, intended to allow contributors to draw conclusions on the actual 
processes of reception, compliance and/or contestation between the EU and international 
legal orders on that basis. A final one-day workshop: ‘Constructive Links or Dangerous 
Liaisons? The Case of Public International Law and European Union Law’, closed the Series 
and served to put findings into perspective, reflect upon them, and consider how best to 
articulate the link between the two regimes.2 
 
The current state of affairs provided the background to this exercise. Ever since Van Gend en 
Loos,3 the character of the Union’s system as ‘a new legal order’ has fascinated legal 
scholars.4 Although international lawyers may instinctively assume the direct applicability of 
general international norms to the EU, particularly taking into account its treaty origins and 
distinct legal personality, there are complex ramifications originating in its sui generis nature 
as a (constitutionalising) system of ‘supranational’ law.5 
                                                          
* Lecturer in Law, Director of the Immigration Law Programme and Co-Director of the Centre of European and 
International Legal Affairs (CEILA), Queen Mary University of London.  
** Lecturer in Law and Co-Director of the Centre of European and International Legal Affairs (CEILA), Queen 
Mary University of London. All websites were last accessed on 10th July 2016. 
1 For further details, see: <http://www.law.qmul.ac.uk/research/centres/clsgc/events/seminars/index.html>.  
2 The programme is available at: <http://www.law.qmul.ac.uk/events/items/135279.html>.  
3 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. See also Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629; and Case 
6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
4 See, generally, Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti and Ramses A. Wessel (eds), International Law as Law of 
the European Union (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 2012); Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (2nd 
edn, Oxford: OUP 2011); Malcolm Evans and Panos Koutrakos (eds), Beyond the Established Legal Orders 
(Hart 2011); Jan Wouters, André Nollkaemper and Erika de Wet (eds), The Europeanisation of International 
Law: The Status of International Law in the EU and its Member States, (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008); 
Marise Cremona and Bruno de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008); Martti 
Koskenniemi (ed), International Law Aspects of the European Union, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 1998). 
5 Jan Klabbers, ‘The Changing Image of International Organisations’, in Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo 
Heiskanen (eds), The Legitimacy of International Organisations, (NY: United Nations University Press, 2001) 
221; Trevor C. Hartley, ‘International Law and the Law of the European Union – A Reassessment’ (2001) 71 
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On the other hand, as it is further detailed in the following sections, the piecemeal approach 
followed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) thereafter has not helped 
providing a coherent or systematic basis to the relationship between the two legal orders. 
Although the Court has repeated its commitment to international law in constant 
jurisprudence, reiterating that the Union ‘must respect international law in the exercise of its 
powers’6 and that provisions in agreements signed by the EU ‘form an integral part of [EU] 
law’ from the moment in which they come into force,7 this recognition has resulted in varying 
strategies of integration of international norms into EU law, ranging from unswerving 
compliance to blatant instrumentalisation.8  
 
There is, in fact, nothing in the EU Treaties determining the place of international rules 
within the hierarchy of sources of EU law, nor in relation to its particular effects.9 The limits 
of dichotomous accounts to describe the impact of international law on the EU system – 
relying on concepts such as ‘monism’ and ‘dualism’, from the international/domestic 
discourse – have been exposed by several commentators, who focus instead on the 
asymmetric and constantly adjusting nature of this relationship.10 In the absence of specific 
provisions in the founding Treaties, the systematisation of this relationship has been 
articulated ad hoc by the CJEU. But the case law on this matter has been fragmentary, 
allocating different ranking and effects to international norms, depending on the type of 
instrument and the function it may perform in the particular circumstances.11 The Court has 
distinguished several degrees of intensity in the effects of international law, differentiating 
several methods of incorporation, each of them subject to different conditions. Ziegler has 
discerned, at least, three distinct mechanisms: direct effect; indirect effect or conform 
interpretation; and ‘substantive borrowing’.12  
 
At the same time, since the Lisbon Treaty came into force it is an explicit objective of the 
Union to ‘uphold and promote’ its values in the relations established with the wider world, 
thereby contributing not only to ‘the strict observance’, but also to ‘the development of 
international law’.13 The EU, therefore, according to the literal tenor of Article 3(5) TEU, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
British Yearbook of International Law 1; René Barents, The Autonomy of Community Law, (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2004); Bruno de Witte, ‘European Union Law: How Autonomous is its Legal Order?’ (2010) 
65 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 141. 
6 Case C-286/90 Poulsen [1992] ECR I-6019, para 9; Case C-405/92 Mondiet [1993] ECR I-6133, paras 13-15; 
Racke (n 16) para 45; Case C-308/06 Intertanko [2008] ECR I-4057, para 51. 
7 Case 181/73 Haegeman [1974] ECR 449, para 5; Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-3989, 
para 52; Case C-311/04 Dordrecht [2006] ECR I-609, para 25. 
8 Bruno de Witte, ‘International Law as a Tool for the European Union’ (2009) 5 ECLR 265. 
9 P. Gragl, ‘The Silence of the Treaties: General International Law and the European Union’ (2015) 57 German 
Yearbook of International Law 375. 
10 Katja S. Ziegler, ‘International Law and EU Law: Between Asymmetric Constitutionalisation and 
Fragmentation’, in Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed), Research Handbook on the Theory of International Law, 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011) 268. See also, Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘The Neo-Monism of the European Legal 
Order’, in Cannizzaro, Palchetti and Wessel (n 4) 35. 
11 Ramses A. Wessel, Close Encounters of the Third Kind: The Interface between the EU and International Law 
after the Treaty of Lisbon, Swedish Institute of European Policy Studies (Dec. 2013) 
<http://www.sieps.se/en/publikationer/close-encounters-of-the-third-kind-the-interface-between-the-eu-and-
international-law-after-the-treat>. Cf. Allan Rosas, ‘The European Court of Justice and Public International 
Law’ in Wouters, Nollkaemper and de Wet (n 4) 75. 
12 See Ziegler (n 10) 298-309. See also, Katja S. Ziegler, ‘The Relationship between EU Law and International 
Law’, in Dennis Patterson and Anna Södersten (eds), A Companion to EU Law and International Law (London: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2016) 42, 45. 
13 Art. 3(5) TEU. See also Art. 21(1) TEU. 
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should emerge not only as a passive norm recipient, but also as a shaper and generator of 
international norms.14 
 
The relationship between the two regimes has, however, been put under constant strain after 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Negotiations regarding the accession of the EU to 
the ECHR have stalled after the Court of Justice delivered its Opinion 2/13,15 drawing 
heavily on the notion of ‘autonomy’ of both the EU legal order as such and of the jurisdiction 
of the Court as the last arbiter over its correct interpretation.16 And with ‘autonomy’ being 
hailed as a key tool to preserve ‘the specific characteristics of the EU and EU law’,17 a new 
era (of closure and isolationism) seems to have been inaugurated in the relationship between 
the EU legal order and international law. 
 
Against this background, the objective of this Special Issue is to examine the interplay 
between EU law and international law, from both the perspective of the EU and the 
international legal system, searching for a sound theoretical foundation that explains and 
systematizes the link between the two. But before going into the presentation of the specific 
structure and content of the volume, some observations mapping out the origins and evolution 
of this complex relationship are in order. In the next two sections, we will explore and 
problematize the roots of the multiple entanglements that unite the two legal systems and set 
the basis of our collective quest for a comprehensive theoretical framework, embracing the 
co-implication, embeddedness, and interdependency between public international law and EU 
law that give the title to this Special Issue. 
 
 
2 Enigmatic entanglements 
 
The law of the European Union, and especially its growing interlacing with the law of its 
Member States, continues to beguile legal scholars, as the vast array of literature in this area 
demonstrates. And even though the question of the legal status of EU law within the legal 
order of the Member States remains an evergreen in European legal studies,18 lawyers should 
be wary of focusing too much on this relationship, while blanking out the EU’s relationship 
with public international law and just treating it as mere ‘background law’ or the reflection of 
State will.19 As Christiaan Timmermans, former CJEU judge, meaningfully observed, ‘[t]he 
relationship between European [Union] law and public international is a complex one’,20 and 
it remains as such to this day. Compared to the bourgeoning studies on the Union’s role as an 
actor in international relations, the relationship between international and EU law receives far 
less attention and remains an almost arcane area in legal scholarship.21 
 
                                                          
14 For a detailed review, see Dimitry Kochenov and Fabian Amtenbrink (eds), The European Union’s Shaping 
of the International Legal Order (Cambridge: CUP 2013). 
15 Opinion 2/13 EU Accession to the ECHR [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
16 Art. 19 TEU. See further, P. Gragl, ‘The Reasonableness of Jealousy: Opinion 2/13 and EU Accession to the 
ECHR’ (2015) European Yearbook of Human Rights 2015 27. 
17 Opinion 2/13 (n 15), para 174. 
18 Bruno de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in Paul Craig and Gráinne de 
Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 323. 
19 Samantha Besson, ‘How International is the European Legal Order?’ (2008) 5 No Foundations 50, 50. 
20 Christiaan Timmermans, ‘The EU and Public International Law’ (1999) 4 European Foreign Affairs Review 
181, 181. 
21 Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti, and Ramses A. Wessel, ‘Introduction: International Law as Law of the 
European Union’, in Cannizzaro, Palchetti, and Wessel (n 4) 1. 
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The key problem in analyzing the relationship between international and European Union law 
is that the perspectives on it are predominantly informed by certain preconceptions, notions, 
and theories of these two respective bodies of law – depending on the respective lawyer’s 
tradition and academic upbringing.22 This means that a clear vision of this issue is, from the 
outset, blurred by a ‘level-of-analysis problem’, or the question whether – to borrow terms 
from international relations theory – one selects a macro-, meso- or micro-level of analysis.23 
In other words, it depends on whether one views the EU from either an international legal or 
EU legal vantage point.  
 
Public international lawyers principally regard the character of EU law as particular 
international law and the EU as an international organization,24 as it has been created by 
States and is founded on treaties. Therefore, it is nothing more than an – albeit highly 
sophisticated – international law construct.25 Conversely, European Union lawyers would 
object to this position. Although they might agree that EU and international law might have 
been a happy family once,26 the umbilical cord between the maternal (international law) and 
the filial legal order (European Union) has been severed, leading to what may constitute a 
‘self-contained’ regime.27 Because of its high degree of ‘constitutional’ development, 
supranational components, and the density of legal regulation among the EU and the Member 
States,28 the European Union may accordingly be seen as a quasi-constitutional, autonomous 
and sui generis legal order that is certainly not a State, but not a classic international 
organization either. 
 
This question of viewpoint is, however, not a mere theoretical sophism. By choosing one of 
these two particular perspectives, one implicitly also chooses the way normative relations 
between international and EU law will be framed – and it is evident that an international legal 
analysis leads to different results in cases of conflict than one starting from European 
constitutionalism:29 if we assumed that the Union legal order were mere regional international 
law, the question of status and effects of international norms within EU law, including that of 
normative conflicts between those two bodies of law, would need to be answered on the basis 
of international rules on the conflict of treaties and by the principles governing the internal 
law of international organizations. But according to its case law, the CJEU, conversely, 
                                                          
22 Ziegler (n 10) 269-270. 
23 J. David Singer, ‘The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations’ (1961) 14 World Politics 77, 77-
78. 
24 Cf. e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘L’unité de l’ordre juridique international’ (2002) 297 Recueil des Cours 9, 438 
et seq.; Ingolf Pernice, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-
Making Revisited?’ (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 703, 711; Theodore Schilling, ‘The Autonomy of 
the Community Legal Order: An Analysis of Possible Foundations’ (1996) 37 Harvard International Law 
Journal 389-409; Alain Pellet, ‘Les fondements juridiques internationaux du droit communautaire’ (1994) 5 
Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law 193, 245. 
25 Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘Conceptualizing the Autonomy of the European Union’, in Richard Collins and Nigel 
D. White (eds), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy (London: Routledge, 2011) 340. 
26 Jan Klabbers, ‘Völkerrechtsfreundlich? International Law and the Union Legal Order’, in Panos Koutrakos 
(ed), European Foreign Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011) 95. 
27 Bruno Simma and Dirk Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International 
Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 483. 
28 Joxerramon Bengoetxea, ‘The EU as (More than) an International Organization’, in Jan Klabbers and Åsa 
Wallendahl (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2011) 449. 
29 Ziegler (n 10) 270. 
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considers Union law to be a distinct body of law and the Union itself – not unlike States – a 
subject of international law with its own internal legal order.30  
 
2.1 Constitutional fusion with Member State law 
 
It was clear since the Union’s inception as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 
and the European Economic Community in 1957, respectively, that EU and international law 
were inextricably related. After this new legal entity had been established by sovereign 
nation-States (‘the Member States’) on the basis of international treaties, there was no doubt 
that the Union’s predecessors all were creatures of international law.31 Yet, the following 
decades saw certain developments, which raised considerable doubts regarding the EU’s legal 
nature. If we consider the ‘internal’ viewpoint of EU law, the CJEU pursued an ever-
deepening integration among the Member States by claiming that EU law not only had direct 
effect under certain conditions,32 but also was supreme vis-à-vis Member State law.33 Apart 
from that, the Court also identified the Treaties as ‘the basic constitutional charter’ of the 
Union,34 which allows for a reading of the EU Treaties in which they have been 
‘constitutionalized’. Consequently, the EU has become an entity, which is no longer a ‘pure’ 
international organization, but something akin to a super-State-like polity.35  
 
These far-reaching effects on the legal orders of the EU Member States have often been 
interpreted as a near-fusion of European Union and Member State law into one unified legal 
system36 – and thus as a monist interweaving of two kinds of legal bodies in which Union law 
reigns supreme.37 Yet, at the end of the day, the EU is plainly not a State.38 It appears to 
remain in a position of limbo, halfway between confederation and federation.39 Other 
designations of the European Union encompass terms as diverse as ‘supranational’ 
organisation,40 ‘association of sovereign States’ (or Staatenverbund, a term originally coined 
by the German Constitutional Court),41 and a ‘new type of authority’.42 But, all in all, these 
phrases only describe the empirical uniqueness of the European project and the conceptual 
perplexity surrounding it,43 without capturing its normative dimension in all its facets. 
                                                          
30 Anne Peters, ‘The Position of International Law within the European Community Legal Order’ (1997) 40 
German Yearbook of International Law 9, 10-11. 
31 Schilling (n 24) 403, and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403, 
2413. 
32 Van Gend & Loos (n 3), 13. 
33 Costa v ENEL (n 3), 594. 
34 Case 294/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para 23. 
35 J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 12. 
36 Michael Potacs, ‘Das Verhältnis zwischen der EU und ihren Mitgliedstaaten im Lichte traditioneller Modelle’ 
(2010) 65 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 117, 137-138. 
37 Stefan Griller, ‘Völkerrecht und Landesrecht – unter Berücksichtigung des Europarechts’, in Robert Walter, 
Clemens Jabloner, and Klaus Zeleny (eds), Hans Kelsen und das Völkerrecht (Vienna: Manz, 2004) 109. 
38 Cf. Tobias Lock, ‘Why the European Union is not a State’ (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 
407-420. Cf. also Opinion 2/13 (n 15), para 156, wherein the CJEU explicitly asserted for the first time(!) that 
the EU could not be considered a State under international law. 
39 Kimmo Kiljunen, The European Constitution in the Making (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 
2004) 21-26. 
40 Cf. e.g., the Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950, available at <http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-
information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm>. 
41 BVerfGE 89, 155 – Maastricht; 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92, 12 October 1993. 
42 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Supranationale Union als neuer Herrschaftstypus: Entstaatlichung und 
Vergemeinschaftung in staatstheoretischer Perspektive’ (1993) 16 Integration 210-224. 
43 Thomas Gehring, Die Europäische Union als komplexe Internationale Organisation (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2002) 9. 
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Eventually, the European Union seems to be more than an ‘ordinary’ grouping of States, and 
because of its high degree of ‘constitutional’ development, the most meaningful (and, at the 
same time, the most meaningless) way to define the EU is as a sui generis organization – 
which is, despite the uniqueness of every single international organization, even more sui 
generis than others.44 However, the interest of this discussion notwithstanding, the 
relationship between the EU and its Member States is not the principal issue here, which has 
been discussed at length in other academic works.45 It is rather the ‘external’ viewpoint, 
which is the central question to be examined in this Special Issue. 
 
2.2 Legal autonomization from international law 
 
Whilst the CJEU pursued an integrating approach towards Member State law, it concurrently 
sought to differentiate EU law from its legal basis, i.e. international agreements, and its 
maternal legal order, i.e. public international law. Whereas the Court still considered the 
then-Community a ‘new legal order of international law’ in Van Gend en Loos,46 it simply 
dropped the addendum ‘international law’ in Costa v ENEL one year later and maintained 
that ‘[b]y contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own 
legal system …’.47 In addition to that, the CJEU subsequently postulated that the Union legal 
order was ‘autonomous’ from international law, and pursued ‘its own particular objectives’.48  
 
This concept of autonomy, inter alia, entails, as the Court later held, that international 
agreements cannot affect the autonomy of Union law,49 that ‘the validity of any [Union] 
measure … must be considered to be the expression … of a constitutional guarantee 
stemming from the [EU] Treaty as an autonomous legal system’,50 and that international 
agreements concluded by the Union must not alter the functional nature of its organs, for 
instance that of the Court of Justice.51 This can only be done through the ‘constitutionally’ 
foreseen treaty amendment mechanism under Article 48 TEU.52 
 
By separating EU law from the rest of international law, the Court privileged the application 
of Union law, instead of general international law, within the legal systems of the Member 
States and thereby further consolidated the supremacy of Union law. As a consequence, 
Member States whose constitutions required non-domestic law to be transformed into 
national law in order to have effect, could not extenuate or nullify the effectiveness of EU 
law by adopting a derogating lex posterior.53 In legal theoretical terms, the CJEU 
appropriated the instruments of its creation and ‘liberated’ the Union from the contingencies 
of general international law. It moved the source of its validation from international law to its 
                                                          
44 Bengoetxea (n 28) 448-449. 
45 Cf. e.g. the fine analysis by Barents (n 5). 
46 Van Gend en Loos (n 3) 12 (emphasis added). 
47 Costa v ENEL (n 3) 593. 
48 Opinion 1/91 Draft Agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European 
Free Trade Association, on the other, relation to the creation of the European Economic Area (EEA I) [1991] 
ECR I-6079, para 30.  
49 Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (Mox Plant) [2006] ECR I-4635, para 123. 
50 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and 
Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, para 282. 
51 Opinion 1/09 European and Community Patents Court [2011] ECR I-1137, paras 76-89. 
52 Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455, para. 58. 
53 Anne Peters, Elemente einer Theorie der Verfassung Europas (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001) 244. 
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own legal order and transformed the Treaties into the basic norm upon which the EU’s 
constitutional edifice is built.54 
 
From the perspective of the European Union and its Court of Justice, the question whether the 
Union has originary or derivative international legal personality has, therefore, become 
superfluous55 – the crucial point is that by ‘elevating’ the Union to a legal order which is 
autonomous from the rest of international law, the CJEU has helped the EU legal ‘child’ to 
outgrow its international legal matrix. It is accordingly unquestionable that, as the distance 
from traditional international law augmented, the EU legal order became more ‘domestic’ or 
‘internal’ in nature as a result.  
 
2.3 Reception despite autonomization 
 
Despite the autonomization of European law, the dynamics of the EU-international law 
relationship are not straightforward. It may seem extremely paradoxical that while the 
European Union ‘withdrew’ from its international legal sources and was gradually 
‘autonomized’, it also started to display – not unlike regular domestic systems – a certain 
‘openness’ towards the international legal order. After all, the EU’s constitutional aspirations 
– similar to those of State law – remain ultimately subordinate to public international law.56 It 
is worth noting in this context that the EU does not seem to take issue with allowing binding 
international norms to become part of the Union legal order, either general international law, 
including customary norms,57 or international agreements,58 concluded by its own 
institutions.59 On the contrary, as already mentioned, the Court does not tire to stress that the 
Union ‘must respect international law in the exercise of its powers’60 and that international 
law forms ‘an integral part of [Union] law’.61 
 
From this perspective, the case law of the CJEU on international law has shown (at least, at 
first sight) a very ‘monist’ and open attitude towards international law.62 As pointed out 
above, both customary international law and international agreements concluded by the EU 
(Article 216(2) TFEU) become, ipso facto, part of EU law without the need for further 
measures of transposition or incorporation.63 This is why, when the Court, quite 
controversially, stated in the Banana Market case, that the provisions of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) – to which the EU is a party – cannot be invoked to 
                                                          
54 Tsagourias (n 25) 340. 
55 Werner Schroeder, Das Gemeinschaftsrechtssystem (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2002) 153-154. 
56 Lucas Lixinski, ‘Taming the Fragmentation Monster through Human Rights? International Constitutionalism, 
“Pluralism Lite” and the Common Territory of the Two European Legal Orders’, in Vasiliki Kosta, Nikos 
Skoutaris, and Vassilis P. Tzevelekos (eds), The EU Accession to the ECHR (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014) 
231. 
57 Cf. inter alia, Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3655, paras 25 et seq.; and 
Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council [1998] ECR II-2739, para 77. 
58 Cf. inter alia, Case 104/81 Kupferberg & Cie KG (Kupferberg I) [1982] ECR 3641, para 11. 
59 Ramses A. Wessel and Steven Blockmans, ‘Between Autonomy and Dependence: The EU Legal Order under 
the Influence of International Organizations – An Introduction’ in Ramses A. Wessel and Steven Blockmans 
(eds), Between Autonomy and Dependence (Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 2013) 1. 
60 Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Mainz (n 57) para 45; Case C-286/90 Anklagemyndigheden v 
Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp [1992] ECR I-6019, paras 9-10; Case C-405/92 Mondiet 
[1993] ECR I-6133, paras 13-15. 
61 Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State [1974] ECR 449, para 5. 
62 Ziegler (n 10) 292-293. 
63 Rosas (n 11) 75. 
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challenge the lawfulness of Union law64 and, in Portugal v Council, that the legality of 
measures adopted by the EU institutions are not to be reviewed in the light of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) agreements – to which the Union is also a party, it was seen as a 
break with this monist approach.65  
 
Further ruptures in the hitherto monist fabric of the relationship between EU and public 
international law transpired in subsequent cases. Prominently, in Intertanko, the Court 
refused to review the legality of a Directive which practically incorporated an – albeit for the 
EU not binding – international convention into Union law;66 and, most significantly, in the 
Kadi saga, the CJEU annulled a Regulation implementing a United Nations Security Council 
Resolution, because of its infringing of fundamental rights (Kadi I)67 – a stance that the Court 
later confirmed, despite considerable, yet still insufficient, developments for the protection of 
fundamental rights at the UN level (Kadi II).68 
 
These judgments raise the questions whether the CJEU has become reluctant in ensuring 
compliance with international law,69 and whether and how this significant shift in the Union’s 
focus, from building bridges with international law to apparently burning them, can be 
explained on a legal theoretical basis. One might, therefore, ask whether the EU’s current 
position towards international law should now be characterized as a dualist ‘wall’, which is 
intended to safeguard the Union’s autonomy,70 or if this relationship has become a new 
testing ground for pluralist theories of law and legal relationships.71 What is evident is that 
the EU currently lacks a clear and coherent approach towards international law,72 which 
could be satisfactorily described as a genuine theoretical framework – the usefulness of the 
monist/dualist parallel increasingly emerging as rather limited.  
 
 
3 The quest for a theoretical framework 
 
There is far more to theorizing and classifying than just tidy-mindedness or ‘a common-sense 
prejudice pedantically expressed’,73 in particular because the debate about the relationship 
between international and domestic law (given the premise that the EU can actually be 
classified as a internal legal order to a sui generis organisation) has not been entirely fought 
                                                          
64 Case C-280/93 Germany v Council (Bananas – Common Organization of the Markets) [1994] ECR I-4973, 
para 112. 
65 Piet Eeckhout, ‘The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems’ (1997) 
34 Common Market Law Review 11, 28-29; Kirsten Schmalenbach, ‘Art. 216 AEUV’, in Christian Calliess and 
Matthias Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV-Kommentar (4th edn; Munich: C.H. Beck, 2011) para 31.  
66 Case C-308/06 The Queen, on the application of International Association of Independent Tanker Owners 
(Intertanko) and Others v Secretary of State for Transport (Intertanko) [2008] ECR I-4057, paras 49-50. 
67 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v 
Council and Commission (Kadi I) [2008] ECR I-6351. 
68 Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi 
(Kadi II) [2014] 1 C.M.L.R. 24. 
69 Federico Casolari, ‘Giving Indirect Effect to International Law within the EU Legal Order: The Doctrine of 
Consistent Interpretation’, in Cannizzaro, Palchetti, and Wessel (n 4) 395. 
70 Achilles Skordas, ‘Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit as Comity and the Disquiet of Neoformalism: A Response to 
Jan Klabbers’, in Panos Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011) 126. 
71 Ziegler (n 10) 274. 
72 Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The ECJ and the International Legal Order: A Re-Evaluation’, in Gráinne de Búrca and 
J.H.H. Weiler, The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2012) 108. 
73 Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (reprint; London: Routledge, 1996) 160. 
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out.74 It is obvious that the Court of Justice of the EU has, so far, not furnished a theoretically 
substantiated reason for the existence of the Union as an autonomous system that prevails 
over the law of its Member States, and how this body of law in turn interrelates with public 
international law. Its case law is consequently seen as mainly based on pragmatic and 
teleological arguments, such as the proper functioning of EU law and hence the achievement 
of the goals set out in the Treaties.75 One may doubt whether the judges in Luxembourg 
really had a fully-fledged theory of EU law in mind when they pronounced it an autonomous 
legal order.76 Of course, judges must in all cases make a final decision, and, by doing so, they 
do not necessarily always rely on a firm theoretical grounding.77 
 
This raises the question whether it is actually sensible to force the Court’s jurisprudence, 
which is ostensibly based on functionality and effectiveness arguments, into a theoretical 
corset.78 On the other hand, although in ‘the interpretation of a badly drafted Commission 
regulation concerning the fat content of skimmed-milk powder there is little place for 
competing national theories of legal philosophy’,79 pragmatic jurisprudence usually develops 
into a certain system which may be described in theoretical terms. So, why should we not 
attempt to embed this system and its relationship to another body of law into a clear and 
working theoretical framework?  
 
This is all the more important because the object and purpose of such a theorical exercise is 
normally to clarify the relevant corpus juris, to provide the rules for the future development 
of the system, and thus to safeguard the Rule of Law and the principle of legal certainty 
underpinning it.80 The same applies in a theory describing the relationship between the law of 
the European Union and public international law. If successful, it would provide us not only 
with an answer to the question regarding the EU’s lineage (is it a mere sub-system of 
international law or an autonomous, if not self-contained, legal regime?), but also to the 
problem of how the Court’s incoherent case law regarding international law and normative 
conflicts between international and EU norms can be resolved.  
 
Former President of the International Court of Justice, Rosalyn Higgins, aptly pinpointed that 
‘[a]t the heart of any chapter on international and national law is always an explanation of the 
two theories of monism and dualism’.81 This relationship is often presented in terms of 
conflict of legal orders at a level of high theory,82 which – to a certain extent – also pertains 
to the interface of international law and the law of the European Union. And although the EU 
is not a State in the classical Westphalian meaning, questions with regard to the role of 
international norms within the Union legal order can be raised in a similar fashion to that in 
which nation-States receive and interact with international law. However, since ‘there is 
                                                          
74 Robert Pfeffer, Das Verhältnis von Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009) 82. 
75 Schroeder (n 55) 196. 
76 Mark L. Jones, ‘The Legal Nature of the European Community: A Jurisprudential Analysis Using H.L.A 
Hart’s Model of Law and a Legal System’ (1984) 17 Cornell International Law Journal 1, 51-52. 
77 Gunnar Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) 19. 
78 Schroeder (n 55) 197. 
79 Lord Jack Mackenzie Stuart, ‘The Acceptance of Community Law in the English Legal Order’ (1991) 6 
Vorträge und Berichte – Zentrum für Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht 1, 6. 
80 Henry G. Schermers, ‘The Role of the Member States in Filling Lacunae in EC Law’, in Roland Bieber and 
Georg Ress (eds), Die Dynamik des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts/The Dynamics of EC-Law (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1987) 311-312. 
81 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process – International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994) 205. 
82 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 48. 
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nothing more practical than a good theory’,83 the question remains what kind of legal 
theoretical tools are required to explain the relationship of this legal order with general 
international law,84 particularly since the concepts of monism and dualism are subject to 
fervid criticism, as falling short of providing a comprehensive account, and are sometimes 
denounced as ‘unreal, artificial and strictly beside the point’,85 or even likened to creatures of 
the horror genre and despised as ‘intellectual zombies’86 or the ‘undead’.87 But one should 
admit that, despite the pitfalls of these dichotomous conceptions, they still offer at least a 
starting point from where to begin the theoretical enquiry,88 a certain minimal basis for the 
understanding of how to conceptualize the relationship between an internal (yet 
supranational) legal system vis-à-vis international law in a theoretical normative dimension.89 
The purpose should be to take the analysis a step further, recognising the limits of the 
monism-dualism dyad, while building upon it, to identify the key elements of a sound, 
holistic framework. 
 
 
4 The objective and structure of this Special Issue 
 
Against this background, the objective of this Special Issue is to examine the interplay 
between EU law and public international law, and – most importantly – their impact, 
‘interlockedness’, and formative influence on one another, respectively, from the perspective 
of the EU and the international legal system. Building on the research already undertaken in 
the field, this volume will thus focus on the methods, processes, and mechanisms of cross-
fertilisation, mutual supportiveness, and conflict between international law and EU law.  
 
By examining the means, dynamics, and underlying rationales of reception (and rejection) 
between the two legal orders, the contributions herein will fill an important gap in the 
existing literature. They will improve our understanding of law in the post-modern, 
globalised world,90 and open new directions to future research on (and beyond) legal 
pluralism. The final, overarching goal they jointly pursue is to analyse, both theoretically and 
practically, the co-implication, embeddedness, and interdependency between public 
international law and EU law, heralding a process of re-definition of their relationship, 
capable of offering a comprehensive account of their interaction that overcomes the 
limitations of monist, dualist, and pluralist approaches. 
 
The contributions have been grouped around three main criteria, going from the macro-, to 
the meso-, to the micro-level of interaction between international and EU law, taking account 
of both perspectives – to try overcome the ‘level-of-analysis’ problem. At the first level, 
                                                          
83 Anne Peters, ‘There is Nothing more Practical than a Good Theory: An Overview of Contemporary 
Approaches to International Law’ (2001) 44 German Yearbook of International Law 25-37. 
84 Keith Culver and Michael Giudice, ‘Not a System but an Order’, in Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis 
(eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 54. 
85 Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The General Principles of International Law’ (1957/II) 92 Recueil des Cours 1, 71. 
86 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship between 
International and Domestic Constitutional Law’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 397, 400. 
87 Alexander Somek, ‘A Tale of the Undead’, in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komárek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism 
in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) 343. 
88 Joseph G. Starke, ‘Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law’ (1936) 17 British Yearbook of 
International Law 66, 66. 
89 Janne Nijman and André Nollkaemper, ‘Introduction’, in Janne Nijman and André Nollkaemper (eds), New 
Perspectives on the Divide between National and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 3. 
90 Cf. e.g., Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Law after Modernity (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013). 
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contributions focus on the systems of norms taken as a whole and tease out their interplay at 
that general level. Then, the second group of contributions look at the concrete means and 
tools that organise the interaction between legal regimes, taking account of the nature and 
rank of the different sources at play, with the final set of contributions descending to the 
bottom of legal relations as they are played out within specific policy areas, engaging with 
the particulars of substantive law. A closing chapter theorises on the whole, taking the 
discussion in the other parts of the Special Issue into account and attempting a re-formulation 
of the links between the two legal orders and their means of interaction, setting the ground for 
an alternative, comprehensive theory of EU-international law relations. 
 
Hence, starting from the beginning, the first group of contributions investigates the role of 
rules of general international law in the structural shaping of the EU legal order, whether by 
conscious choice of the EU legislator/CJEU or in the more subtle, yet inevitable, way in 
which legal principles and secondary rules of recognition, personality, or interpretation fill 
lacunae in special regimes of (international/regional/supra-national) law.  
 
Niels Blokker opens up this part with a diachronic investigation of the international legal 
personality of the European Communities first and the European Union in present times, and 
how the gradual development of this concept is inspired by corresponding developments in 
international law. Beyond the historical depiction of this progress, he will also flag up 
important legal questions as to whether and to which extent individual EU institutions and 
entities of the organisation may themselves enjoy international legal personality and what the 
implications of such a finding may be for their role in the international plane. Especially 
when taking into consideration Union agencies, such as Frontex, the question of international 
legal responsibility, which would then also entail responsibility for wrongful acts under 
international law, becomes extremely relevant.  
 
Gunnar Beck, in turn, engages in an exhaustive examination of the interpretative strategies 
employed by the Court of Justice of the EU. By scrutinizing the case law of the Court in 
several key areas of European law, it will become apparent how frail the boundary between 
legal interpretation and judicial activism is. Beck will take us through different key decisions 
that exemplify the selective approach the Court has followed to Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, enshrining customary norms of interpretation. His 
findings on the ‘cumulative’ methodology of the Luxembourg judges will have a decisive 
impact on the issue of legal (un-)certainty. The overarching question in this regard will be 
whether and to which extent general rules of interpretation are being re-defined and exploited 
to foster a targeted, teleological development of EU law. 
 
On these bases, the second group of contributions deals with the instruments of inter-
penetration that operationalize the links between EU and international law. Direct effect, 
indirect effect, and persuasive influence are taken into consideration, with the authors in this 
part of the Special Issue looking at particular sources of international law and the ways in 
which they are ‘absorbed’ within the EU legal order. Processes of transformation and 
adaptation of international sources, once ‘Europeanised’, will be highlighted here, as will also 
be the reverse operation, whereby EU law rules may become a source of international law.  
 
Theodore Konstadinides and Ramses A. Wessel, respectively, will look into the interaction 
between EU law and (customary) international law in terms of mutual influence, further 
development, and potential cross-fertilization. The contribution by Theodore Konstadinides 
will start off by examining the place of international customary international law within the 
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EU legal order, in particular with regard to the question as to how custom can be relied upon 
by individuals and Member States against EU law acts to contest their validity. The last 
section will then ponder the question of whether EU law could be considered a special kind 
of customary international law and whether it could contribute to its generation. Ramses A. 
Wessel will further address this issue by ‘flipping the question’, i.e. not by studying what 
effects international norms have within EU law, but by asking whether and to which extent 
European Union law itself is being received in the international legal order, especially given 
the EU’s ambitions as a global rule-maker. Thus, he will raise the question of how Union law 
influences international law through international agreements, unilateral acts, customary 
international law, international institutions, and judicial referencing and interpretation. In 
other words, his contribution will enquire whether EU law does constitute a source of 
international law in the sense of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
 
Elena Basheska and Dimitry Kochenov, in turn, will analyze the status of general principles 
of international law, focusing in particular on the principle of good neighborly relations 
underpinning UN law. They will investigate the nature and specific rights/obligations content 
of the principle, both at international law and as part of the EU legal order. The close 
connection of the principle with other foundational values of EU law, including democracy, 
the Rule of Law, and the principle of loyalty (to other Member States and the EU as a whole) 
will have special significance for the framing of the crises currently plaguing the EU 
(Eurocrisis/refugee crisis) and may determine as such the illegality of certain courses of 
action adopted by specific Member States, not only from an international good 
neighbourliness perspective, but crucially also from the viewpoint of EU constitutional 
principles. As the authors will demonstrate, good neighbourliness necessarily points in the 
direction of the very raison d’être of the EU. 
 
The final set of contributions, as already announced, focuses each on a specific policy area, 
looking at sometimes diverging, sometimes converging modes of governance in different 
realms. Eileen Denza launches this part of the Special Issue, analysing how links between 
legal systems can be forged or broken, in particular between the EU and the United Nations 
(in terms of the Kadi saga), and the EU and the European Convention on Human Rights (in 
terms of Opinion 2/13). She thus explores the conditions of co-existence and interaction at 
institutional and substantive level between the EU and other organisations and instruments of 
international law of fundamental importance to the EU legal order. She thereby helps making 
the transition between Parts 1-2 and Part 3 of the volume. 
 
Christian Tomuschat dwells further on the substantive relationship between the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the system of fundamental rights within the EU. He will 
provide an outlook on how the issue of human rights protection, both before the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty and after that, influenced the further evolution of EU law. Given 
the lack of a codified ‘EU Bill of Rights’ before the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Court 
of Justice necessarily had to rely on international human rights law (particularly the European 
Convention on Human Rights) in order to ensure an effective protection of fundamental 
rights. The interaction between these two bodies of law in this specific area and the risk of 
isolationism, particularly in the aftermath of Opinion 2/13, is of utmost significance to the 
process of European integration.  
 
Besides human rights, there are, however, several other substantive areas of the law where 
the EU legal order interacts with international law, which require elucidation. To this end, 
Rafael Leal-Arcas and Stephen Minas will map out international and European governance 
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tools and processes regarding the management of renewable energy in order to identify gaps 
and overlaps in this regard. They will also propose ways in which these gaps could be filled 
and overlaps eliminated in the context of the interplay between public international law and 
EU law, identifying spaces for multi-level cooperation and harmonisation. They will 
demonstrate that there is indeed considerable mutual interconnection and reciprocal influence 
between these two legal orders, despite the lack of normative or institutional coordination, 
which remains to be adequately cultivated.  
 
Building on the findings of Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the Special Issue, Katja Ziegler will piece the 
puzzle together, returning to the systemic, macro-level perspective and systematising the 
instruments used at the meso level, revisiting the key forms of interaction between the two 
regimes and assessing their benefits and limitations. She will focus on the dualist turn taken 
by the Court of Justice, culminated in Opinion 2/13, and revise its conception of 
‘autonomy’.91 Her contribution will show that there is a trend in the jurisprudence of the 
Court that tends toward closing off EU law vis-à-vis international law. She will argue that 
isolating EU law from international law is not only damaging to the international legal order, 
but could also eventually undermine the legitimacy and the very foundations of the EU. She 
will offer instead an alternative model in which to ground EU-international law relations, 
based on a constructive rule of engagement between EU and international law that, mediated 
by the principle of systemic integration, preserves the uniqueness of the European legal order, 
but transcends the conception of autonomy understood as autarky and isolation, propounding 
a harmonious complementarity with international law.92 
                                                          
91 For a detailed account of the different ‘meanings’ of autonomy within the EU legal framework, see Katja S. 
Ziegler, ‘Autonomy: From Myth to Reality – or Hubris on a Tightrope? EU Law, Human Rights and 
International Law’, in Sionaidh Douglas-Scott and Nicholas Hatzis (eds), Research Handbook on EU Human 
Rights Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, forthcoming), available as University of Leicester School of Law 
Research Paper No. 15-25 at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2665725>. 
92 In this line, see also V. Moreno-Lax, ‘Of Autonomy, Autarky, Purposiveness and Fragmentation: The 
Relationship between EU Asylum Law and International Humanitarian Law’, in J.-F. Durieux and D. Cantor 
(eds), Refuge from Inhumanity: Enriching Refugee Protection Standards through Recourse to Humanitarian 
Law (Boston/Leiden: Brill, 2014) 295; and V. Moreno-Lax, ‘Systematising Systemic Integration: “War 
Refugees”, Regime Relations, and a Proposal for a Cumulative Approach to International Commitments’ (2014) 
12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 907. 
